RESPONSE TO FRAULEY, SIMECEK, SLUGAN, AND WHIT EcROSS
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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this article is to conclude this special issue of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology by responding to Jon Frauley, Karen Simecek, Mario Slugan, and Rosalchen Whitecross’ criticisms of A Criminology of Narrative Fiction. I am very grateful to editor-in-chief David Polizzi for this opportunity and, as always, flattered that my peers have devoted so much time to reading the monograph and writing about it, regardless of whether their evaluations are encouraging or disparaging. A response to each of the issues raised by each of the critics at a corresponding level of detail is not possible within the confines of a journal article so I have restricted my reply to the most compelling objections against my argument from each critic.

KEY WORDS: Counterfactual thinking, Fiction, Mimesis, Narrative, Phenomenology

In Defence of Miami Vice
My use and selection of case studies – or exemplificatory examinations as Jon Frauley (2021b) prefers to call them – is the subject of some controversy. As Mario Slugan points out, all seven of my case studies are relatively short in length (averaging five pages) and all but one (Beverly Hills Cop) intended to provide empirical evidence for my theoretical propositions. Of these six, none have attracted as many or as vehement objections as Michael Mann’s Miami Vice (2006), including criticism from Frauley, Slugan, and Rosalchen Whitecross in this journal special issue. The objections began with a description of the study as ‘outlandish’ by one of the referees of the first journal to which I submitted the article (McGregor 2020) I mention in my synopsis (McGregor 2021b), a comment that was endorsed by the journal’s editor. It continued with a participant at a workshop telling me that the film ‘gives me no idea what it is like to dance with Colin Farrell’
(who plays Sonny Crockett) – and thus, I assume, (also) no detailed and accurate representation of the power dynamics of organised crime (my claim in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction). For Slugan (2021: 106), the study simply raises a long list of unanswered questions about organised criminal enterprises:

Do they really operate from undisclosed locations in Port-au-Prince? Do they really use motorcades to usher in new hires? Can they really jam mobile phone signals? Do they really operate killing fields of hundred [sic] meters or more? Do they really possess the exact cars, weapons, jewellery, etc. depicted in the film? Or is this simply iconography typical of how cartels are represented in crime films?

Frauley’s critique is more generous, but he nonetheless maintains that Miami Vice provides evidence that fictions reflect rather than represent reality. I was curious as to why the film was singled out in this way and presented the study to as many audiences as possible to determine whether I had in fact erred in my selection. Taking the objections I have received in their entirety, my employment of Miami Vice seems to have created an impression of the research (sic) process that goes something like this: I wander into a film theatre with my salted popcorn and diet cola one evening, become engrossed in the onscreen antics, and leave with a comprehensive understanding of the power dynamics of cocaine cartels via a virtual reality experience of dancing with Gong Li (who plays Isabella) in a Havana nightclub. Worth every penny of the £4.99 admission! A more troubling version of this caricature is that if I was a justice minister or drugs czar instead of a mid-career academic, I need only watch Miami Vice to understand what policies need to be implemented to reduce the harms perpetrated by cocaine cartels.

Here is the – my – actual research process. I first watched Miami Vice on the big screen, when it was released in the UK in 2006, prior to returning to university for postgraduate study. I remember leaving the theatre with three distinct impressions: (1) the film had both remained faithful to the television series and achieved something far more ambitious than the series; (2) the inclusion of Isabella, who does not appear in the series, as a protagonist alongside Crockett and Tubbs (played by Jamie Foxx) provided the narrative with an inventive and manifold affective structure; and (3) disappointment about the prevalence of stylisation over realism in the climactic firefight at the Miami docks. My primary focus was on the integration of form and content in a complex narrative representation, an (almost) entirely ‘aesthetic appreciation’ of the film in In Karen Simecek’s (2021: 131) terminology. My second viewing was at home, on DVD, a year later, and remained focused on the relationship between form and content. I watched Miami Vice twice more over the next decade, becoming more interested in the way in which the film represents organised criminal enterprises as its narrative structure became increasingly familiar. I screened the film for the student criminology society in 2018, realised that it was a valuable pedagogic tool, and started showing the short scene I analyse in Chapter Six of A Criminology of Narrative Fiction in class. After doing this twice, with satisfying results on both occasions, I began to think about whether the film might have aetiological as well as pedagogic value. To answer one of Frauley’s concerns with all of my studies, the reason I thought Mann might have something interesting to say about organised crime is that he is an auteur with experience and expertise in making films with violent criminal protagonists, from Thief (1981) to Heat (1995) to Collateral (2004) to Public Enemies (2009). On the basis of my research expertise in policing and teaching expertise in serious and violent crime, I became more confident that Miami Vice had value beyond the pedagogic and conducted preliminary research on the problems of policing organised crime. Only once I had corroborated this intuition did I begin the research that produced the case study. My subsequent viewings of the film were – in Simecek’s (2021: 130) terms – focused on its ‘criminological insights’ (rather than aesthetic or artistic merits).

Contra Frauley, Miami Vice (and the other five studies in Chapters Four, Five, and Six) are case studies rather than exemplifications or illustrations. Miami Vice as examined and employed in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction is not a case study of organised crime (though it could form part of such a study in another monograph or a journal article), but a case study of the aetiological value of a complex narrative fiction – specifically, of the way in which the stylistic and structural devices of the cinematic narrative provide mimetic ‘knowledge of the absolute power.
wielded by the senior management of organised criminal enterprises’ (McGregor 2021a: 112). I am not claiming that it provides mimetic knowledge of (or is a case study of) Cuban dance, the length of killing grounds used by mercenaries, the sartorial choices of senior management, or undercover policing operations. Frauley is correct to state that the case studies in the monographs are not case studies of the crimes and harms themselves, but they could all constitute a significant part of such studies if the narrative fictions were examined in more detail. Simecek (2021) shares a similar concern about the process I have described above, asking how criminologists choose which narrative fictions to study. One way of answering this question is in the same way that we select articles, reports, and monographs as more conventional sources of data, i.e. by deploying some combination of expertise in the subject and expertise in research methodology. When considering complex narratives as sources of data, the criminologist must also have expertise in narrative representation, which is becoming increasingly common, particularly among critical and cultural criminologists. Another way to answer the same question is to set out a more formal process, which I have done in Critical Criminology and Literary Criticism (McGregor 2021c), where I focus exclusively on what may be the most complex category of narrative representation, the fourfold allegory.

Jon Frauley’s Fictional Reality and Criminology

As I made clear in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction (McGregor 2021a), Frauley (2010) is a criminologist for whom I have great admiration, particularly but not exclusively for his publication of Criminology, Deviance, and the Silver Screen: The Fictional Reality and the Criminological Imagination, which was the single most significant influence on A Criminology of Narrative Fiction. As such, I am especially grateful to him for both reviewing (Frauley 2021a) and critiquing (Frauley 2021b) the monograph. The latter is a comprehensive and sustained critique of A Criminology of Narrative Fiction and although it is indeed ‘appreciative’ rather than disparaging, Frauley (2021b: 113) maintains that the monograph fails to establish a theory of the criminological value of fiction on the basis that my arguments for the phenomenological and mimetic values of narrative fiction are unconvincing. The reason these arguments lack conviction is for the most part due to ontological and methodological omissions that give them an opaque character. Frauley (2021b: 113) has charitably phrased his evaluation of my theory of the criminological value of narrative fiction as ‘not fully realised’ rather than failed and although his criticisms are numerous and uncompromising there is clearly far more on which we agree than disagree. Frauley’s most compelling objections can be summarised as: (1) I have sacrificed clarity for brevity; (2) there are too many ontological and methodological omissions in the monograph; and (3) my claim that that fiction represents reality is erroneous.

While I hope his claim that I sacrificed clarity for brevity is not entirely accurate, there are indeed omissions in the monograph – many, if not most, deliberate. In my synopsis (McGregor 2021b), I noted the constraints of Bristol University Press’ New Horizons in Criminology series, which publishes only short monographs (a sixty thousand word maximum) and follows a strict structure (six substantive chapters between a short introduction and conclusion). Within these limits, I wanted to spend as much space as possible demonstrating the theory in practice and providing evidence of its usefulness for criminology. Achieving this aim required brevity throughout the monograph, in the literature review and methodology as well as in the case studies. One solution would have been to reduce the case studies to one rather than two each for the phenomenological, counterfactual, and mimetic values of fiction (Frauley’s format in Criminology, Deviance, and the Silver Screen). What is crucial to my approach, however, is that my theory is not just applicable to feature films or novels, but to all complex narrative fictions regardless of their mode of representation. As such, I wanted to include films, novels, television series, and graphic novels and include more than one example of each where possible. In retrospect, I think a better solution to the problem would simply have been to draw attention to the monograph’s location within the series, in the way that Bill McClanahan (2021) does in Visual Criminology, which was the next to be published. By subtly reminding his readers of the aims and scope of the series, McClanahan manages expectations of what can and cannot be achieved in a
single, short monograph. This is also why, as Frauley (2021b: 117) correctly claims, I have ‘sidelined’ signification, focusing on the aetiological (causes of crime and social harm) at the expense of the semiotic (production and reception of representations).

Frauley is, once again, correct in stating that I made ontological and methodological omissions when setting out my theory; there are omissions of both types in the monograph. Some are a consequence of my preference for brevity and others because I do not consider them particularly important. Frauley (2021b: 114) summarises the ontological basis of my thesis as: ‘Ontologically, then, fiction and non-fiction narratives are the same.’ Broadly speaking, this is accurate. There is a lengthy, ongoing, and to my mind largely uninteresting debate in analytic philosophy about the ontological status of fiction (and the ontological status of fictional characters in particular) to which I have no desire to contribute. A more accurate statement of my position is that the epistemic and ontological differences between fictional and nonfictional complex narrative representations is insignificant. I suggest three reasons for this insignificance in Chapter One. An omission I perhaps should have discussed in more detail is the role of authorial intention in the determination of textual meaning, although there are also lengthy debates in both literary theory and literary aesthetics on the subject that have little to offer the criminologist. Where I think Frauley’s criticism has more cogence is in drawing attention to my methodological omissions: in, for example, failing to set out how other criminologists might approach other narrative fictions as part of an aetiological inquiry. I have tried to remedy this omission in *Critical Criminology and Literary Criticism* (McGregor 2021c), as noted above. The book, which is also a short monograph, develops a methodology for interdisciplinary inquiry and sets out an explicit model of collaboration between critical criminologists and literary critics.

I have not answered the objections from ontological and methodological omissions in detail because I think they are underpinned by a – perhaps, the only – fundamental difference between Frauley’s approach to fiction and my own, which I had not fully grasped until reading his critique. In spite of Frauley’s extensive and exhaustive engagements with fiction, he cannot (or does not want to) overcome the residual distrust of the social scientist, which restricts the role of fiction in research to what I call the semiotic. Frauley’s (2021b: 118) most damaging objection to my theory is stated as follows (*Miami Vice* is the target): ‘However, first, any assertion of correspondence between the film’s representation of organised crime and real-world organised crime is problematic because it is this correspondence theory of truth that underpins the fiction/non-fiction dichotomy that McGregor rejects (Frauley 2016a).’ I do indeed reject the truth/falsity dichotomy as the basis of the nonfiction/fiction distinction, but I do not reject the correspondence theory of truth. My (McGregor 2021a: 18) position on truth in criminology is stated on several occasions, the first of which is ‘the social world is an external reality and [...] social facts have a truth value, but [...] researchers have only partial access to reality, in consequence of which criminological knowledge is approximate to rather than correspondent with reality.’ The claim that facts about the causes of crime are approximate rather than correspondent is not a rejection of truth, only a recognition that social scientists are unlikely to ever be able to establish, for example, the complete causes of a particular crime beyond all doubt. The fact that when I watch *Miami Vice* I use other sources in evaluating whether the film represents or misrepresents the reality of organised crime does not undermine my use of fictions as a source of data because I would seek to triangulate my data regardless of its source. I am rejecting falsity as definitive of fiction (and truth as definitive of nonfiction), not truth as a goal for criminological inquiry (albeit ultimately unattainable). If I rejected truth in the way Frauley suggests, then I would by my own definition be a constructionist rather than a realist.
Karen Simecek’s Valuing Crime Fiction
Simecek opens her critique with a clear, concise, and completely accurate summary of my central thesis. She then restates that thesis in philosophical terms, exploring the relationship between knowledge and understanding in criminological inquiry to draw out the implications of my thesis for philosophical inquiry. Simecek (2021: 130) has two criticisms of A Criminology of Narrative Fiction, which might be described as concerns with rather than objections to my theory of the criminological value of narrative fiction, and both of which are related to the ‘instrumentalising’ of fiction. Simecek frames this concern in terms of two demands made by me: (1) on readers (which I shall refer to as ‘audiences’) and on (2) authors (which I shall take to include directors, studios, or both). With respect to the former, she (Simecek 2021: 130) asks whether there is a conflict ‘between appreciating a narrative as a work of art and between analysing it as a source of criminological data’. My initial approach to narrative representation, which was focused on literary narratives (McGregor 2016), was to set out the artistic or literary value of a work or text in terms of the extent of the integration of literary form and literary content within the work or text. Simecek interprets my later claim that fictions provide phenomenological, counterfactual, and mimetic knowledge as precisely a separation of the content (the criminological data) from the form-content integration (the experience of the work or text). If form and content are integrated, then I cannot claim criminological knowledge; if form and content are not integrated, then the criminological knowledge has no significant relationship to the fictionality of the narrative.

I gestured towards an answer to this type of question in Narrative Justice (McGregor 2018), where I described the distinction between and compatibility of reading a literary narrative as a work of literature (realising its literary value) and reading a literary narrative as a narrative (realising its cognitive value). I noted that both literary value and narrativity could be categorised as ‘aesthetic value’, but deliberately avoided use of the term or discussion of the issue. In retrospect, I think this was an unsatisfactory solution to the problem, although it does at least indicate the direction a more convincing response should take. The idea that there is a significant and close relationship between artistic form and artistic content originates with J.C. Friedrich von Schiller’s (1794) On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters. Schiller (1794: 97) argues that the ‘play-drive’, which is the subject of the discipline of aesthetics, harmonizes the ‘sense-drive’ and the ‘form-drive’ in the human psyche. Frederick Beiser (2005: 119) characterises the Letters as a ‘sustained defense of beauty’, both as an end in itself (form-content integration) and as a means to the end of political harmony (aesthetic education). The bridge between the final and instrumental values of beauty is the play drive, which harmonizes the psyche (aesthetic education) and takes ‘living form’ (form-content integration) as its object (Schiller 1794: 101). In a similar manner to Schiller’s play drive, my conception of ‘literary thickness’ (which can be extended to narratives in other modes of representation) as a particular type of interest in a work provides a bridge between the final and instrumental values of literature (McGregor 2016: 107). Literary thickness synthesises the substantive and formal axes of a work, i.e. the interest in the relations among the words (or words and images) within the work or text and the interest in the relations between the words (or words and images) in the work or text and what they represent in the world. The substantive axis thus situates the work or text within the world and works or texts that reward the demand for literary thickness have a capacity for aesthetic education, broadly construed in terms of their cognitive, ethical, and political capacities. My revised answer is thus that the integration of form and content grounds both the artistic or aesthetic values of the representation (with which I am little concerned in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction) and the cognitive (which includes ethical and political) values of the representation (with which I am concerned in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction). 1

Experiencing Miami Vice can be either an aesthetic end in itself or a means to the end of criminological knowledge and it can even be both at the same time in the case of the ways in which that film provides knowledge of the power dynamics of organised crime.

Simecek’s main concern is, however, with the demands I make of the author. She (Simecek 2021: 133) rightly claims that the author must have sufficient expertise to provide criminological insight through aesthetic means and develops this point to express the following worry: “this sets the bar very high for the authors whose works are to be used as a source of criminological data.
and consequently, significantly limits the number of works that the criminologist can study.’ I agree completely. First, I think that the number of works with criminological value is relatively small, even if one restricts oneself to the definition of exemplary narratives in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction. Most but not all complex narratives – whether artistic (or aesthetic), genre (or popular), or both – are either of little interest to the criminologist or misrepresent the reality of crime and its control. There is a well-established tradition of engaging with the latter within what I have called the cultural criminological framework. Second, I imagine that most but not all authors are uninterested in the criminological value of their creations. Authors who revisit criminological subjects and themes, such as Mann, may well develop the dual expertise to which Simecek refers and his auteurship of Heat and Public Enemies in particular suggests such an intention on his part. Another reason why I prioritised number over detail in my case studies was because I wanted to make the point that in spite of the relative rarity of this achievement, there remain a great many narrative fictions available to criminologists as sources of data. Simecek (2021: 133) concludes:

The consequence of this worry is that we might still accept that works of narrative fiction may have a role to play but this comes with a warning: be careful which works of narrative fiction you use in your study and remember that it cannot do all of the work, it must be treated in tandem with empirical work (whether by the author or the reader).

Once again, I agree. My interest is in the work undertaken by the audience, reader, or researcher and this need not be exclusively empirical, but must nonetheless – as noted above – be triangulated.

**Mario Slugan’s Fiction, Knowledge and Cinematic Realism**

Like Frauley, Slugan is highly critical of A Criminology of Narrative Fiction; unfortunately, unlike Frauley, he finds little of value in it. Four main objections can be distilled from his critique: (1) my claim that the cinematic mode of representation has the greatest capacity for mimetic representation; (2) my characterisation of fiction in terms of a practice; (3) (all of) the case studies; and (4) my epistemological position. I shall not respond to these objections individually, but rather to Slugan’s (2021: 100) general approach to the monograph. His comment on my pragmatic adoption of Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen’s (1994) distinction between fiction and nonfiction in terms of being different social practices sets the tone and the texture of the rest of the critique: ‘If I were writing with tongue in cheek, I would wonder whether McGregor has unwittingly found a boundary between fiction and nonfiction.’ With regard to at least three of his four objections, I am very surprised and a little disappointed to find so much of what philosopher Lewis Gordon (2014) refers to as disciplinary decadence. Disciplinary decadence ‘is the phenomenon of turning away from living thought, which engages reality and recognises its own limitations, to a deontologised or absolute conception of disciplinary life’ (Gordon 2014: 86). In other words, disciplinary decadence is instantiated when an academic views the world – or, more charitably, academic debate – exclusively from the perspective of her discipline. Slugan is an accomplished film studies scholar with an enviable talent for synthesising analytic and hermeneutic-phenomenological approaches to his subject – most recently in Noël Carroll on Film: A Philosophy of Art and Popular Culture (Slugan 2019) – but his interdisciplinary imperative appears not to extend to criminology. His critique is constructed from the perspective of film studies, which is welcome, and evaluates A Criminology of Narrative Fiction as a work of film studies, which is not.

Slugan’s criticism of the case studies is the most obvious evidence of disciplinary decadence. He (Slugan 2021: 105) claims that they are much too short, in consequence of which there is a serious ‘dearth of detail’. As noted in my response to Frauley, I accept the length of the case studies as a weakness in the monograph, although I would not reduce the number of case studies were I to rewrite it. I do not, however, see the purpose or value of comparing my case studies to Gérard Genette’s (1983) case study of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, which is several hundred pages long. I wonder if readers of this article can imagine a criminology
monograph – and a particularly lengthy one, at that – which consists entirely of a single case study of a fictional text. We may be able to imagine it, but its chances of publication would be extremely slim (if not nil). Gray Cavender and Nancy Jurik’s (2012) Justice Provocateur: Jane Tennison and Policing in Prime Suspect is probably the closest to this template. Notwithstanding, the short monograph (one hundred and sixty-six pages) covers all seven seasons of ITV’s Prime Suspect (1991-2006), providing nowhere near the kind of detail Slugan recommends. Case studies, exemplificatory examinations, and illustrations of cultural artefacts – especially, but not exclusively, fictional texts – are almost always brief in criminological publications, usually considerably more so than my case studies. To take two recent examples from the ultra-realist engagement with narrative fiction: as discussed in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction, Thomas Raymen (2018) employs AMC’s The Walking Dead (2010-2021) and Fear the Walking Dead (2015-2021) to explore the conceptual foundations of ultra-realist criminological theory; and Keith Hayward and Steve Hall (2021) use ultra-realist theory to provide a political critique of the phenomenon of Nordic noir. In the first, ten television seasons are discussed in a part rather than the whole of a single journal article. In the second, an entire genre consisting of hundreds of fictional texts in at least two modes of representation is discussed in an article published in one of the discipline’s most prestigious journals. My three case studies in Critical Criminology and Literary Criticism are eighteen pages each and I suspect that I am pushing at the upper limit of what criminologists are prepared to read when the subject of that study is produced and received within the social practice of fiction. As film theory, A Criminology of Narrative Fiction is hopelessly inadequate. But it is not film theory; it is criminological theory. Evaluating the monograph as a work of film studies is about as useful as evaluating Miami Vice as a documentary on undercover policing.

Like Frauley, Slugan (2021: 105) objects to my handling of ‘truth’, which he frames as an epistemological omission: ‘Within that [critical realist] framework one would expect first that the truth of the representation needs to be ascertained somehow.’ Slugan suggests that, in the case of Martin Amis’ (2014) The Zone of Interest, this might be achieved by comparing the fictional representation with relevant nonfictional representations. That is, of course, precisely what I would do were I using the novel (which is a case study of the way in which narrative fictions provide phenomenological knowledge in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction) as part of a case study of participation in genocide – but there are two points to clarify. First, my claim about the lack of a reliable means to distinguish fiction from nonfiction in Chapter One (which does not preclude the need to make a distinction for practical reasons and disciplinary constraints) is precisely that the epistemic distinction between fictional and nonfictional complex narratives is insignificant. Nonfictional narratives – diaries or documentaries, let us say – are subject to the same problems as fictional narratives with respect to verification. Second, as a social scientist, I would no more take The Zone of Interest as a single source of information about genocide than I would Traudl Junge’s (2002) Until the Final Hour: Hitler’s Last Secretary or Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985). The same is true of discursive rather than narrative texts, including the late Nicole Rafter’s (2016) excellent The Crime of All Crimes: Toward a Criminology of Genocide. As I have already noted, all data requires triangulation before it can be incorporated into research findings.

**Rosalchen Whitecross’ Reflections on A Criminology of Narrative Fiction**

Whitecross begins her critique with a comprehensive and systematic summary that divides A Criminology of Narrative Fiction into two parts, the conceptual framework (Chapters One to Three) and the demonstration of the aetiological value of fiction (Chapters Four to Eight). Her (Whitecross 2021: 140) reflection draws on narrative psychology, specifically the narrative hermeneutics of Hanna Meretoja (2018), with an interest in ‘how the thesis of a criminology of narrative fiction corresponds to the reflection or representation of stories about crime and social harm utilised towards the reduction of crime and social harm to move beyond prevailing stories.’ Whitecross’ reply focuses on two parts of the monograph: (1) the first page and (2) the seventh chapter, ‘Criminological Cinema’. These are discussed separately before being drawn together in her conclusion. I start my first chapter with Bronwen Hughes’ feature film, Stander (2003), which
provides a twofold illustration. First, of why so many criminologists object to the proposal that (some) narrative fiction is a source of data (because most narrative fictions represent crime and its control inaccurately). Second, of why criminology is not (or should not be) the study of crime alone, but the study of crime and social harm (or, indeed, just harm). Whitecross proceeds from Stander to apartheid in South Africa (1948-1994) to Damon Galgut’s (2021) The Promise and thence to the way in which Galgut’s novel exemplifies Meretoja’s hermeneutics. I am delighted that my monograph has afforded such a deep and rich reflection, crossing disciplinary boundaries from criminology to both (analytic) philosophy and (hermeneutic) psychology.

Whitecross’ focus on Criminological Cinema is concerned with my discussion of the pedagogic role of narrative fiction in criminology. My approach in A Criminology of Narrative Fiction was to first show why previous criminological engagements with fiction do not extend beyond the semiotic and pedagogic roles (Chapters Two and Three), then make my case for the aetiological role of narrative fiction by means of its phenomenological, counterfactual, and mimetic values (Chapters Four to Six), and finally to demonstrate the relationship between the aetiological and pedagogic roles (but not, as Frauley points out, the semiotic role) in my thesis (Chapter Seven). The relationship between the aetiological and pedagogic roles is discussed exclusively in terms of Hollywood feature films. This selection is made on the basis of three criteria: (1) the size of the audience (narrative fictions that are experienced by dozens of millions of people); (2) my lack of expertise in the Indian, Nigerian, and Chinese film industries (a consequence of my linguistic limitations); and (3) the ease with which what I refer to as mythic storytelling can be decoded in the narrative fictions (which is decisive in favour of film as opposed to television). Whitecross cites Rafter’s (2006) (also) excellent Shots in the Mirror: Crime Films and Society (which I explore in Chapter Three of A Criminology of Narrative Fiction) and asks which films the instructor should select to facilitate, augment, or enhance the communication of knowledge. She proposes Richard Attenborough’s Cry Freedom (1987) as a more satisfactory and successful alternative to Stander.

Whitecross’ concern about the selection process for films with pedagogic value recalls both Simecek and Frauley on the selection of narrative fictions with aetiological value. The processes are similar in that they rely on and require a particular and perhaps peculiar combination of expertise in the researcher or instructor, but they are distinguished by differing degrees of difficulty. My experience of selecting narrative fictions with aetiological value is that it takes time and requires repeated engagements with a work and extensive comparison and contrast with similar works. I have tried to show the complexity of the process in my discussion of Miami Vice and have tried to formalise at least one version of the process in Critical Criminology and Literary Criticism. The selection of films for the classroom is much easier and I comment on this process in Chapters Three, Seven, and Eight of the monograph, using David Ayer’s End of Watch (2012) as an example and Martin Brest’s Beverly Hills Cop (1984) as a case study (of the pedagogic value of Hollywood cinema). My criteria are not particularly demanding and my decision to show the latter to a class would be based on the following: the film (1) illustrates the concept (intersectionality) clearly, (2) engages the audience (in virtue of its combination of humour and excitement), and (3) does not provide a discriminatory perspective on characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and socioeconomic status. As I teach criminology rather than film studies or philosophy of film, I would restrict my use of film in the classroom to examples that represent their subject accurately or authentically rather than those that represent their subject erroneously or spuriously. One could, of course, use Stander in the classroom, but its pedagogic value is much more likely to be about the ways in which biographical films misrepresent their protagonists than the reality of apartheid in South Africa in the nineteen seventies and eighties. I am grateful to Whitecross for this opportunity to reflect on the pedagogic process in a little more detail than I did in the monograph.

Notes

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This revision owes a great deal to the work of Tzachi Zamir (2020), especially his *Just Literature: Philosophical Criticism and Justice*.

This assessment of *Beverly Hills Cop*’s perspective should be read in conjunction with my comments in the monograph on the ways in which the film has – and has not – become dated in the four decades since its release (McGregor 2021a: 127-128).

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Reference List


