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"The incommensurability of Matza's theory of drift with a sense of injustice in juvenile delinquents"

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ABSTRACT:

The word 'drift' is used in criminology primarily as a verb, to indicate movement from a state of non-offending to offending and vice versa. However, Matza intended and used the word 'drift' as a noun, a consequence of being pushed and pulled by forces extraneous to the self which creates the condition of an effect similar to anomie. In this paper, I reinterpret Matza's theory of drift and argue that his sociological theory of delinquency presupposes a psychological theory of personality in a way that replicates the Glueck-Sutherland debate of the 1940s by professing the salience of social factors while assuming the primacy of psychological processes. I argue that Matza's sociological argument is incommensurate with the particular psychology of personality formation that his theory presupposes. I provide an alternative account of how anger that precedes delinquency is formed in the personalities of offenders using Alfred Adler's Individual Psychology.

Key Words: David Matza; Theory of Drift; Deep Anger; Negative Emotionality; Alfred Adler

Introduction

Perhaps influenced by Matza's (1964) seminal work *Delinquency and Drift* (hereafter D & D), the word 'drift' has been used unproblematically in the discipline of criminology; however, there are warrantable reasons to critically reexamine its definition and usage. First, the use of 'drift' as a verb in academic criminology is not consistent with Matza's intention and definition. 'Drift' has been used to indicate the movement of delinquents from a state of non-offending to offending, and vice versa, pushed and pulled by street culture (Anderson, 1999), neighborhood norms (Moule et al., 2015), and uncertainties in the labor market (Young, 2007). Yet, there is another usage that has been largely overlooked despite its original intent (Currie, 2010). Second, this non-critical reflection and usage may have been shaped by the inordinate attention Matza's work on techniques of neutralization has received (Sykes & Matza, 1957) rather than his theory of drift. Third, Matza's account of causal ordering of delinquency assumed in D & D incorrectly imputes basic features of the psychology of motivation that underlies theories of crime. In this paper, I reinterpret Matza's theory of drift and argue that his sociological theory of delinquency replicates the Glueck-Sutherland debate of the 1940s by erroneously assuming a structural theory of personality formation.

Theories of crime make basic assumptions about human nature and society. These philosophical assumptions serve as the foundation of the causes of crime and the solutions proposed to reduce it (Hall & Winlow, 2015). As Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p. 112) note, the range of possible assumptions about human nature tend to be limited. We might refer to these ontological assumptions made about human nature as *metanarratives*. Metanarratives are fundamental philosophical presuppositions about what it means to be a self; they are metaphysical—nature of reality—statements about the constitutive elements of selfhood that are embedded in philosophy and ethics (Hall & Winlow, 2015).

There are six metanarratives that inform most theories of crime. The first metanarrative is a theological one which assumes the innate wickedness of humans, which social institutions must then control. Hirschi's (1969) control theory assumes such a metanarrative by presupposing the capacity of all individuals to commit crime a priori. The second metanarrative assumes the basic goodness of humans who then become corrupted by social institutions. This Rousseauian position parallels Matza's (1964) theory of drift, which imputes blame to the criminal justice institutions for creating the perceptions of injustice in juvenile delinquents which facilitates their involvement in crime. The third metanarrative proclaims the capacity to reason as the defining feature of subjecthood. Whether the subject involves an offender who weighs the risks and rewards of her offense (Clarke & Cornish, 1985) or a decontextualized subject who must formulate public policies in a veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971), the capacity to arrive at a utilitarian outcome through application of reason embodies the Cartesian sense of self embedded in Western philosophical thought.

The fourth metanarrative subsumes the desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain into a single construct—self-interest. This principle is the cornerstone of most theories of crime (Agnew, 2011). The fifth metanarrative posits the drive toward growth and becoming as a metaphysical characteristic of individuals (Nietzsche, 1964). This assumption is reflected in strain theories where compensatory aggression results from frustration encountered in the pursuit of acquisitive stimuli (Agnew, 1992) or as transcendental identity projects in phenomenological crime theories (Katz, 1988). The sixth metanarrative proclaims the sociality of human being as a metaphysical component in the constitution of the self. This metanarrative is embodied in three incremental ways. The self's recognition of itself is contingent upon an intersubjective exchange between a caregiver and the self, best represented in the theory of Jacques Lacan (1973). In a different way, the self becomes socially constituted by the assuming the hypothetical and reflective burdens of counterfactual dependencies demanded by the assumption of a "generalized other," which then becomes a principal source of consciousness and self (Mead, 1913, 1925). Social process-oriented theories (e.g., differential association, social learning) assume the primacy and strength of attachment to peers and their values rather than parental figures as a source of identity. This metanarrative also highlights the

self's relationship to society as an essential source of consciousness and the self (Mead, 1912). As Mead notes, "we must be others if we are to be our selves" (1925, p. 276). The evolution and maturation of psychology as a social science rather than a branch of moral philosophy hinges on delineating the process of progressive change (Mead, 1910), from a helpless infant to an adult of sound mental health (Maslow, 2011; Rogers, 1961). In major psychological theories of motivation, subjects identify with the father, laws of language, criminal codes, and the cultural myths, norms, and mores of their society in the process of socialization (Freud, 1961; Jung, 1971; Lacan, 1977). The answers criminological theories provide to the question 'what motivates crime?' presupposes one or more of the preceding metanarratives in their theoretical frameworks.

There are valid reasons why a theorist such as Alfred Adler has the potential to contribute to the metanarratives of criminology as a complement to Matza's theory of drift and delinquency. First, Adler's theoretical framework represents one of the original sources of the social metanarratives assumed in psychology and criminology (Agnew, 2014). Second, Adler's theory of personality and delinquency is unified into one cogent account of motivation. Three, Adler's theory has the potential to illuminate the Glueck-Sutherland debate that is implicit in Matza's theory of drift. Finally, Adler's theory of motivation has the potential to explain in cogent ways some of the enduring characteristics of delinquents and criminals that contemporary criminologists and psychologists have found difficult to explain, such as the psychology of grievance and a profound sense of injustice (Brezina, 1998; Caspi et al., 1994).

Although contemporary criminologists have explained the flawed cognitive processes of delinquents as a function of the corrupt nature of the criminal justice system, its agents, and its processes rather than the distortions in the offenders' thinking and modes of relating to the world, thus reproducing Matza's principal argument in D&D (e.g., Gavazzi, Yarcheck, & Chesney-Lind, 2006; Laub & Sampson, 2003), I argue that Alfred Adler's work cogently explains the personality characteristics of delinquents discussed in Matza's classic work by providing a comprehensive theory of motivation, a logical precursor to any theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Simply put, I argue for the primacy of a psychological theory of motivation over a sociological theory of delinquency.

The Misreading of Matza's 'Drift' in Criminology

Criminologists use the word 'drift' primarily as a verb. For example, drift is used to describe the episodic character of drug dealing in America as a way of supplementing dealers' principal wages (Hagedorn, 1994; Highland & Dabney, 2009). However, the most recognized usage is probably captured in the term "zigzag." Laub and Sampson (2003) used this term to describe most of the men in the Glueck study who were neither life-course persistent offenders nor desisters, but those who fell into a "residual" category. They described this "quirky" group as those who desist, but never completely "give up" on offending, at times resembling life-course persistent offenders and desisters on others: "A sizable portion of the offending population displays a zigzag pattern of offending over long time periods" (p. 286). 'Zigzag' accurately describes the in-and-out character of a variety of offenders who dip their toes in crime only to retreat to conventional lifestyles soon after, as well as the offense-related processes described in the criminology literature. Adolescents who drift in and out of delinquency is aptly described as those who zigzag their way in and out of crime, as are the variety of criminals described in the criminology literature who move from desperate need or the emergence of opportunity to the execution of the offense. This process of going into crime and then leaving it can be described as 'episodic' in character, as intended by David Matza in his classic work.

Laub and Sampson (2003) noted that those who 'zigzag' their way through crime tend to be cynical about the world, marked by a sense of grievance at being singled out, from their ethnicity and class, to their treatment in the classroom by their teachers, and later by officials in the criminal justice system. A key characteristic of this group is the tendency to discern injustice and unfairness where others do not, to transform this perceived unfair treatment into anger, which then functions as

a motivation for crime (Piquero, Gomez-Smith, & Langton, 2004). Laub and Sampson also noted that these men, similar to persisters, consume large amounts of alcohol; and similar to other offenders, those who zigzag in and out of crime throughout their lives justify their offenses by denying the harm caused (Sykes & Matza, 1957), viewing criminal behavior in certain contexts as something normative, facilitated by neighborhood culture (Whyte, 1943); or they rationalize their criminal outlook and lifestyle altogether due to the lack of opportunities such as a good family and education. It should be noted that this psychological pattern was already well established throughout the 1960s and 1970s through the work of British psychologists who carried one of the earliest longitudinal surveys of delinquency (Gibson, 1969c; Gibson & Hanson, 1969; Farrington & West, 1971; Osborn & West, 1978). Although this preceding body of work was not cited in D & D, the findings of research on the psychology of delinquency would have worked as a contrapuntal argument to D & D. Despite the usage of drift as a full verb in prior criminological works, Matza did not use the term as such. Matza used the term 'drift' as a noun: "the delinquent transiently exists in a limbo between convention and crime, responding in turn to the demands of each, flirting now with one, now the other, but postponing commitment, evading decisions. Thus, he drifts between criminals and conventional action" (p. 28). Drift is used as a noun in *Delinquency and Drift* in a way that is similar to Durkheim's anomie, a condition that "stands midway between freedom and control" (p. 28) and as something that facilitates a "release from moral constraint" (p. 69). Thus, Matza's work tacitly presupposes a theological metanarrative that enables criminal action. Rather than drifting into delinquency, as does a drug dealer, drift is a consequence of being pushed around by social forces that creates the condition of an effect: "*In that condition, he is rendered irresponsible. The sense of irresponsibility puts him in drift. Drift makes him available for delinquent acts. Whether the drift culminates in delinquency is up to him. Stripped of moral guidance, he momentarily exists in start and frightening isolation*" (p. 89). Matza used the term drift rather than anomie because he wanted to emphasize the ad hoc character of the process of separation from moral rules that enabled delinquency in the first place; he also wanted to differentiate his term from Durkheim's in order to avoid the confusion that the polysemous usage might cause (Currie, 2010). The similarity of drift to anomie is unmistakable as one reads through Matza's work.

The Logical Impediments to Matza's Theory of Drift

One of the innovative conceptual moves that Matza made in his work is that he provided a sociological explanation to a psychological condition often found in delinquents. That is, from Glueck and Glueck (1930, 1950) and Shover (1996) to Moffitt (Caspi et al., 1994), a sense of injustice at having been mistreated by the world permeates the attitudes and worldviews of persistent criminals. In contemporary parlance, this worldview is defined as 'negative emotionality' or a "generalized propensity for experiencing aversive affective states, including anger, anxiety, suspiciousness, and irritability. People with chronically high levels of negative emotionality....live in a world darkened by a rapid, excessive response to minor stressors, a sense that others are malicious, and a propensity to react to even slight provocation with rage" (Moffitt, Krueger, Caspi, & Fagan, 2000, p. 222). Simply put, negative emotionality describes people who see the world as a mean and cruel place, and seethe with anger at the perception of having been grievously wronged and unjustly punished by caretakers, teachers, police, and the world (Piquero, Gomez-Smith, & Langton, 2004). This negative emotional state then colors the subsequent attitude toward other people and the interactions that follow by imputing malice where none exists, feeling wronged when no such injury took place. Piquero et al. (2004) posit that this personality characteristic is a feature of people who possess low self-control.

Matza accounted for this psychological condition by proffering a structural explanation, noting that delinquents are confused by the workings of the criminal justice system, which then contributes to their negative emotional state. In particular, Matza pointed out that delinquents neutralize their offenses by ignoring the distinction between crime and tort, assuming its "vulgar conception" [of tort]. Hence, Matza highlighted the simplistic view of crime that delinquents

presuppose, overlooking the fact that crime constitutes an offense against the state and not merely against the victims; Matza noted that delinquents viewed the state's involvement between the offender and sometimes victimless crimes as an example of gross injustice and their tendency to be singled out by the authorities, failing to recognize the machinery of the state in the process of criminal justice. One consequence of seeing oneself as an object of manipulation by the agents of criminal justice was the cultivation of a mood of fatalism where one primarily sees oneself as an effect, an object that is pushed around and manipulated by forces extraneous to the self. Thus, similar to an alloplastic mode of adaptation where a subject effectuates a change in the external environment as a way of exercising one's moral agency (Halleck, 1971), Matza argued that one way to restore one's moral standing was to commit an infraction. Hence, drift represented a condition, a noun in Matza's framework, but it also served as a precondition that enabled the verb form of the word to materialize—drift into delinquency.

Matza (1964) ascribed the sense of injustice that delinquents feel to two principal sources: the agents of the criminal justice system and its procedures (West, 1973) and the subculture of delinquency. Matza observed that the police feed the delinquent's sense of injustice by relying on confessions (p. 110). This view is supported by contemporary works which indicate that boys end up in detention due to police intervention (Gavazzi, Yarcheck, & Chesney-Lind, 2006). Matza also noted that the criminal justice system practices what he termed a principle of individualized justice, which, along with excessive discretion exercised by criminal justice agents, illustrated the inconsistency between what was obvious and what was proffered as a justification; this operation between the purported rationale was obvious to seasoned delinquents "because he sees the workings of that system out of context" (p. 133). For Matza, this contradiction between what the criminal justice agents publicly professed and actually practiced was ultimately responsible for creating the conditions favorable to drift, a grievous sense of injustice. It is this ascription of causality to criminal justice agents rather than psychological processes that justify Matza as principally a sociologist attempting to provide a sociological answer to a psychological research question.

Matza (1964) also observed that the cultural processes that operate within the social world of delinquents cultivated a sense of injustice. By emphasizing its historical past, Matza noted that "subcultures accumulate events and incidents that are a part of the legacy transmitted to new cohorts" (p. 102). He argued that delinquents possess an oral history tradition which perpetuates grievances: "*subculture of delinquency possesses a rich folklore in which tales of injustice hold a prominent place. Thus, the subculture adherent is not fully dependent on personal experiences....the subculture of delinquency is, among other things, a memory file that collects injustices*" (p. 102). This process is similar to the way those who have been mistreated by the police retell their experiences to family and friends in a way that adverse encounters become a salient collective grievance against the police in general (Gau & Brunson, 2015; Slocum, Wiley, & Esbensen, 2013). As researchers have shown, such retellings are similar to oral histories that reproduce the erosion of trust and confidence in the police (Gau & Brunson, 2010) and become a "memory file" that disseminates a negative view of the police.

Matza accounted for this grievance by explaining it as a "subcultural perspective [which] frequently prompts him to discern injustice where others may not." But even Matza saw the limits of a sociological explanation to account for a psychological condition, for he qualified his explanation with an important caveat: "*The precise point at which justice ends and injustice begins cannot be definitely stated. It is in some measure a matter of perspective and opinion, and thus eternally problematic*" (p. 105). This assertion is problematic because Matza effectively retreated from having to provide an answer at all by framing it as one of opinion and declaring its perennial quality. Having an answer to the origins of a sense of injustice is imperative for Matza as it is the "underlying condition of drift. It is a pervasive sense of delinquents and a preface to the assertion of irresponsibility—the immediate condition of drift" (p. 104). Yet, Matza backtracked from providing an account of this sense of injustice that compels the condition of drift.

Matza's hesitant explanation ignores the fact that this pervasive sense of injustice would have already been present in the delinquent population prior to their involvement with the justice system. If anything, the workings of the criminal justice system would have only reiterated and reinforced their view of an already unjust world, but it would not have served as the original impetus for their delinquency. The original cause would have had to exist outside of the structural factors that Matza attributed in his book. Contemporary criminologists explain the anger that precedes delinquency due to a lack of self-control (Piquero, Gomez-Smith, & Langton, 2004), sense of injustice at not having been protected from exposure to violence by parents (Song, Singer, & Anglin, 1998), and other deep social inequalities within communities (Gorman-Smith, Tolan, & Henry, 2000). This tendency to interpret the world in an adverse light, to see injustice where none exists, defines the essence of a psychology of criminality that has been measured as a correlate of criminal behavior in numerous ways.

Beginning with the Gluecks early in the 20th century (Glueck & Glueck, 1930, 1950) and later in the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, researchers were well aware that delinquency was related to individual level factors such as deceitfulness (Gibson, 1964a, 1964c), poor impulse control (Gibson, 1964b), as well as family-related factors such as parental supervision, parenting style, parental disciplinary practices, parental criminality, and family size (Gibson, 1968, 1969c; Gibson & West, 1970; Farrington & West, 1971; Farrington, 1972). This type of social-psychological approach to delinquency would have marked the first era of criminology before the arrival of the "golden age of theory" when Matza wrote his seminal piece (Laub, 2004). In a way, Matza's account of delinquency mirrored the Glueck-Sutherland debate, for Matza's theory of drift privileges social processes over individual-level variables by assigning primacy to structural factors (e.g., criminal justice system and its agents) rather than psychological ones (e.g., personality factors). This is the exact debate that unfolded between the Gluecks and Sutherland. Gluecks maintained that a host of social psychological variables within the home and in the delinquent's personality accounted for their development into criminals while Sutherland dismissed the multipronged approach to delinquency and emphasized the social processes between adolescents as primary factors (Laub & Sampson, 1991). Hence, for Matza, the individual-level variables that predispose a person toward a sense of injustice is assumed a priori, almost as a metanarrative, without empirical substantiation, and only the structural factors that sustain it (e.g., criminal justice system, subculture of delinquency) are assigned explanatory power.

Matza must have been cognizant of the limitations of his structuralist approach to the psychology of grievance and injustice, for his answer resembled Sutherland's wishy-washy response in his debate with the Gluecks: "*The precise point at which justice ends and injustice begins cannot be definitely stated. It is in some measure a matter of perspective and opinion, and thus eternally problematic*" (p. 105). The Glueck-Sutherland debate, in a nutshell, is that delinquency at an individual level preceded the association with other delinquents in Gluecks' framework (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 234). Sutherland's response (1947, as cited in Glueck & Glueck, 1950, p. 168) was that "*it is not necessary.....to explain why a person has the associations he has; this certainly involves a complex of many things.*" The Gluecks countered that this individual explanation preceded the social processes related to adolescents who hung out with other delinquents. A similar critique could be made about Matza, for the structural factors that purport to explain the source of negative emotionality cannot account for its psychological origins.

The Interpretive Origins of a Sense of Injustice

Why do delinquents and criminals see injustice where others do not? Why do they possess a deep-seated sense of grievance against the world? Why do delinquents rebel against the social order, especially against authority figures who represent it, such as parents, teachers, counselors, and police? This is a research question that is best answered by psychology, for the answer requires a theoretical framework that is able to account for the initial formation of personality. This dilemma

illustrates the close connection between criminology and psychology as academic endeavors that study violence: theories of crime necessarily assume a theory of self (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). And in order to answer the question, how the self comes into existence and relates to the world and the people in it must be established prior to the effect of association with delinquent peers. A theory that purports to explain the sense of injustice must account for the personality that precedes the actions of criminal justice personnel and processes, for it occurs before the peer association of adolescents that lead to delinquency which ensnares them in the criminal justice process (Moffitt, 1993, 2018). Matza's theory of drift begins well after the causal factors related to delinquency have already occurred.

Anger at parents, teachers, police, and other authority figures is evident in the accounts of criminals. They are angry from the bottom of their soul, and this anger suffuses the personalities of offenders. Although contemporary scholars account for the anger as a function of self-control, parental neglect, and inequality at the community level, (Piquero, Gomez-Smith, & Langton, 2004; Song, Singer, & Anglin, 1998; Gorman-Smith, Tolan, & Henry, 2000), they do so in a way that is not connected to a comprehensive theoretical framework, and ignores the agency of individuals. According to the Individual Psychology of Adler, there are two sources of anger, which function as motivation for criminal behavior.¹ First is the anger that arises from being abused and neglected, which then leads to criminal behavior (Lemmon, 2006). Children who have been mistreated early on form the view that the world is a hostile and dangerous place, that they live in a 'dog-eat-dog world'. People who have grown up being hated, neglected, maltreated, and abused have never been accustomed to having things done for them. As Adler noted, people who have been mistreated throughout their childhood expect to be remunerated for the cruel treatment they have received. Consequently, the absence of love and affection during their formative years justifies the attitude of compensation that marks their personality; they feel like they are owed something by the world and its inhabitants, and forcibly take from others what they think they are owed.

Child abuse and neglect are important factors in offending, for almost 70 percent of violent offenders have a history of abuse and neglect (Widom, 2014). Those who are abused and neglected as children go on to begin their criminal behaviors early, report high number of arrests, and physical assault. Thus, the experience of abuse at an early age is a significant predictor of violent offending later in life (Hoffman & Cerbone, 1999; Lemmon, 2006). Adler would have explained this pattern as a function of the attitude of compensation that marks the distorted view of the world and its people (antithetical scheme of apperception); Matza would have attributed the anger that precedes the juvenile offending to the criminal justice system. This feeling of rejection results in a silent but pervasive anger that suffuses the personalities of those who have been mistreated, and then go on to demand special treatment from others around them. Mistreated individuals become angry when they are not accorded this privilege. This anger leads to the forcible and fraudulent taking of what one thinks he is entitled to as a form of compensation for the abuses endured. The self-centeredness of neglected and maltreated people comes from their desire for compensation from their initial losses in life. This type of psychological account would have been warranted in D & D in order to make Matza's theory logically work.

Pampering is the opposite of neglect and maltreatment, and it is the second source of anger that marks the personalities of criminals. People who have been brought up wanting nothing, and have been given everything they could possibly desire, demand similar treatment throughout their lives. They are accustomed to having things done for them, and have been trained in life to expect things to be easy. When people have been indulged in this way throughout their childhood and adolescence, they expect its continuance even as adults. In fact, they demand it, and feel entitled to it. Consequently, they expect and demand others to cater to their desires, and they become angry

¹ This synthesis of Alfred Adler's explanation of pampering and neglect as sources of anger is drawn from a close reading of Adler's 12 volume work, the *Collected Clinical Works of Alfred Adler*, edited by H.T. Stein. Bellingham, WA: Classical Adlerian Translation Project. The citations and references have been left out in order to save space.

when their demands are not met. This original anger leads to the forcible or fraudulent taking of what one thinks one is entitled to as a continuation of pampering. The self-centeredness of pampered people come from their desire for the continuation of special treatment. This account of anger as a consequence of pampering and entitlement is effective because it is able to transcend class; it is able to explain the criminality of sociopaths and psychopaths—persistent criminals—who originate from middle and upper-middle classes in ways criminological theories that rely on traditional background variables such as race, class, and neighborhoods cannot (see Cleckley, 1950; Hare, 1993).

Adler used the term 'personality' and 'attitude' interchangeably, noting that personality was nothing more than a subject's attitude toward other people, work, and life. Although modification can occur throughout the rest of childhood and adolescence, Adler posited that personality was largely formed by the age of five as an infant becomes aware of its dependence on others to meet its basic needs. Contemporary criminologists note that distinct patterns of misconduct can be seen by the age of three, which predicts crime and substance abuse by age 11 (Staff, Whichard, Siennick, & Maggs, 2015). This initial dependence on others leads to feelings of inferiority. Based on this deficiency and lack, subjects attempt to move toward wholeness, completion, and perfection. Adler posited that such strivings were largely done in unconscious ways, not based on some objective criteria but based on subjective interpretation. In order to overcome feelings of inferiority, an individual would create an imagined ideal situation of perfection, what Adler termed "fictional final foal." Although Adler discussed several other factors that led to feelings of inferiority, he was emphatic about the influence of parenting style and birth order on the development of personality (see Eckstein et al., 2010).

This anger that scholars have noted in criminals has been described in various ways. However, the most notable one is that the anger that saturates the personalities of offenders produces an "edginess" in their appearance and demeanor (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Shover, 1996). Although this construct may be difficult to measure and quantify, researchers are cognizant of the fact that something in the offenders' attitude and comportment is amiss. This edginess emerges out of a persistent and generalized anger and a deep sense of grievance against the world that criminals harbor as a function of their distorted private logic, a logic that is antithetical to common social interest and the welfare of others (see Agnew, 2014). This distorted logic emerges in a personality that is oriented toward achieving vindictive personal victories over others, through deceit, guile, and force rather than meaningful contribution to other people. This is the basis of a philosophical psychology that Adler envisioned and formulated into the central tenets of Individual Psychology. It can also be viewed as a metanarrative about crime and selfhood combined into one framework.

The notable point is that neglect and pampering are not objective conditions, but states made meaningful and interpreted subjectively by individuals. That is, someone who was raised in a million-dollar home with wealthy parents could ostensibly feel that she was neglected and mistreated. These personality trends—attitude—are set by the age of five and persist throughout the life course. They are also affected by physical handicaps, birth order, and other factors that influence one's feelings of inferiority. That's why common personality characteristics – or as Adler noted, "attitude toward the world" – are shared by someone who grew up in a wealthy family with a millionaire father and was given everything and someone who was raised in a troubled home, neglected, and abused. Pampering and neglect originate from different sources but lead to the same destination—a sense of injustice at having been shortchanged in life, of being grievously injured by being denied compensation for what they think they are rightfully owed or by being cut off from what they think they are entitled to. I suspect that this type of attitude would have been evident in the delinquents that Matza encountered in his work at the youth detention center. However, he chose sociological canons to explain a psychological condition.

Despite accounting for the original source of a person's anger, Adler advocated interpreting people's behavior in their social and holistic context. Adler explained deviants and criminals using one principal concept in Individual Psychology: social interest. Rather than conceptualizing mental

health by the absence of intrapsychic conflict, Adler (1997 [1927]) was a proponent of examining the self's relationship to society, as indicated by subjects' response to the demands of the three main tasks of life: work, friendship, and love. One could be autonomous, flexible, and devise many ways to solve problems in socially useful ways, or lean on others, become fearful, or adhere to a rigid way of binary thinking and become socially useless. As some have argued, Adler's theory of crime predates the principles of life-course criminology in a number of ways. Just as importantly, Adler is one of a few theorists of crime and personality whose theoretical framework is embodied as a metanarrative.

Discussion and Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that criminology as a discipline has favored the verb form of the word 'drift' when Matza intended for it to be used as a noun. Moreover, I have argued that the noun form of the word assumes a sociological theory of personality development and sustenance that conflates a theory of delinquency with a description of group processes. That is, similar to Edwin Sutherland's theory of differential association, Matza's theory of drift assumes the primacy of a psychological theory of personality in order to explain the anger that leads to delinquency. Without this first premise, Matza's theory of drift is like a roof without a house—to borrow a metaphor the Gluecks used to critique Sutherland's theory of differential association—and illustrates the problem of causal ordering in Matza's theory.

The emphasis that is placed on structures rather than the psychology of offending illustrates the disciplinary canons that affect the theoretical framework of the scholars during the period in which they do their work. It is entirely possible that there were non-academic reasons why scholars could not openly profess their preference and allegiance to a school of thought that was at the periphery of the dominant one. For example, the Gluecks were guilty of this practice as well. The entire theoretical foundation of their study was social-psychological and Adlerian in character, yet, they openly professed their devotion to Sigmund Freud in *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*, and couched their work as a psychoanalytic enterprise when the very definitions, measures, and constructs were derived from the ideas of Alfred Adler. The Gluecks challenged the canons of sociological criminology and paid a hefty price for their rejection of the tenets of mainstream sociology (Laub & Sampson, 1991).

I suspect that Matza, too, would have seen the primacy of an account that privileges the formation of personality and other cognitive factors that influence delinquent behavior, for the delinquents that he interviewed and observed in court would have demonstrated personality trends that contemporary scholars have defined as emotional negativity. The predominance of psychological processes over sociological ones is also notable in Matza's other work. The idea that delinquents have to talk themselves into crime prior to its commission is one of the cornerstones of criminological theory (Sykes & Matza, 1957), the cognitive distortions used irrefutable evidence of a flawed private logic in a variety of criminals (Highland & Dabney, 2009; Hagedorn, 1994; Scully & Marolla, 1984). It is possible that Matza may have held back from applying theoretical constructs from other disciplines and theorists due to the potential costs of deviating from the canons of mainstream sociology. Moreover, the psychological characteristics of delinquents were well-established with the work of the Gluecks (B. Glueck, 1918; Glueck & Glueck, 1930, 1950) prior to Matza's book and Tony Gibson (1964a, b, c; 1971) and David Farrington in the U.K. (Farrington, 1972, 1973; Farrington & West, 1971) after the publication of his book. These two schools of thought would have paved the way for a theory of delinquency that could have explained the sense of injustice that leads to anger that was present in the delinquents, anger that would have been present before their arrest and prosecution in the criminal justice system. The two processes are very closely related, as D.J. West (1973) and Matza (1964) observed. Being processed through the system would have reinforced one's anger at being pushed and pulled throughout the system, as if one were an object; being tussled around the criminal justice system as an arrestee, a defendant,

and an inmate would have led an adolescent to see the administration of criminal justice itself as a form of punishment (Feely, 1979). This perspective is not wrong. Yet, the forces of history in criminology shifted as social-psychological origins of delinquency lost ground to the group-process oriented explanations of sociologists. My argument here and elsewhere is that Alfred Adler and his key ideas were overlooked by both camps.

How would other pioneers in psychology have accounted for this anger that precedes the involvement of criminal justice processes and personnel? Some perspective might help. Alfred Adler was drafted as a physician during World War I, and was responsible for treating soldiers who suffered from post-traumatic stress (shell-shock) and sending them back to the frontlines. He concluded from his experience the need to cultivate social interest in humanity, to relate to other people on a human level, in the mutual interest of community to avoid total war again. Adler's Individual Psychology emerged from his encounter with World War I attempting to explain the process behind the origins of a distorted private logic of neurotics, alcoholics, and criminals. Sigmund Freud observed the war and concluded the presence of a death instinct in humankind, the key to the survival of the species the sublimation of aggressive impulses for scientific and creative ends (Freud, 1961). The divergent interpretations arrived at by the two towering figures in the annals of psychology attest to the insignificance of objective conditions in life. What matters is the meaning and significance subjects assign to their own condition. This assumption that is embedded in the principles of Individual Psychology represents one of the ways in which an Adlerian metanarrative combines elements of agency in order to make his account of more plausible than other narratives.

This subjective interpretation that is involved in the development of one's personality and outlook on life is what Adler termed one's attitude—personality. I have synthesized two sources of anger that is a defining feature of delinquents and criminals throughout the writings of prior scholars and Alfred Adler. In the first, anger that leads to delinquency is explained as a function of the biased workings of the criminal justice system and its agents. This sociological account of anger that functions as a precondition to drift is the position taken by David Matza in his classic book. In the second, anger that leads to delinquency is explained as a subjective interpretation of parental pampering and neglect. This psychological account of anger functions as a personality characteristic that marks criminals' interactions with the world. I have argued in this paper that the first account is problematic on logical grounds, for factors that lead juveniles into delinquency precede the criminal justice processes that are putative sources of the anger displayed by the delinquents. This tendency to impute primacy to structural variables over social-psychological ones reproduces the Glueck-Sutherland debate in *Delinquency and Drift*.

Matza's position was similar to the mainstream sociological accounts of his time, explaining delinquency as a group process that occurs in the context of juvenile peer relations. This period in sociology and criminology represented the "golden age" of sociological criminology that sought to explain delinquency as a group behavior (Laub, 2004): "*of particular importance is the child's intimate association with predatory gangs or other forms of delinquent and criminal organization..... He learns techniques of stealing, becomes involved in binding relationships with his companions in delinquency*" (Shaw & McKay, 1967, p. 316). Shaw and McKay ultimately explained crime as a feature of American cities and their spaces while Sutherland attributed it to a process of differential association. It is this group-oriented process of delinquency that Matza's theory of drift presupposes; and rather than accounting for the anger that precedes crime to psychological operations, he, like Sutherland, imposed sociological factors to an essentially psychological process. As I have argued in this paper, this move is not logically coherent.

No other theorist of personality proffers a more cogent explanatory framework for the development of this original anger than Alfred Adler. Alfred Adler's body of works is preferable to other scholarship that purport to furnish metanarratives for a couple of reasons. First, metanarratives about the intrinsic evilness, corruption of social institutions, reason, and self-interest do not contain actual theories of crime; they are logical precursors of criminal behavior. Moreover, the conciseness of Adler's theory combines two metanarratives into one unified framework about

human motivation and crime. Other metanarratives must perform additional works in order to arrive at how deviation from the typical progression of subjects' movements unfold; Adler's metanarrative uses one construct—social interest—to account for the presence and absence of crime (see Agnew, 2014).

Second, Adler's metanarrative accounts for the anger that precedes criminal behavior. As noted in this paper, Matza's contribution lies in constructing a sociological theory that purports to explain how anger is sustained throughout the lifecycle. However, Matza, like Sutherland, does not explain the initial decision of adolescents to engage in petty offenses that lead to official sanctions in the first place and their exposure to delinquent peers. The process of being funneled through the system could then function as a snare for one's cognitive and personality development for it reinforces their flawed thinking, not their prospects.

Third, Adler's ideas about social interest as a metanarrative is already well established in the doctrines of individual psychology. Although criminologists may lament that "social concern has not received much attention in criminology...and that criminologists need to expand what is perhaps their core assumption" (Agnew, 2014 p. 23), the implications of social interest as cause and control of crime have already expounded on in theoretically cogent and logically consistent ways. What is necessary in the discipline of criminology is to acknowledge the indebtedness of the discipline to key thinkers like Alfred Adler, and then to honestly and systematically test his ideas, not couch it as some novel "discovery." For future works, it may worthwhile to test Adler's theory of anger in criminals. Although there is support for the distorted private logic of murderers and drug dealers (Highland, Kern, & Curlette, 2010; Highland & Dabney, 2009), a subjective account of the phenomenological process behind the meaning-making process is lacking. This qualitative exploration of the subjective interpretative process will make an invaluable contribution to the history of criminology and psychology.

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